Quantum mechanism helps agents combat "bad" social choice rules by Wu, Haoyang
ar
X
iv
:1
00
2.
42
94
v6
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
2 A
pr
 20
11
Quantum mechanism helps agents combat “bad”
social choice rules
Haoyang Wu
Wan-Dou-Miao Research Lab, Suite 1002, 790 WuYi Road,
Shanghai, 200051, China.
hywch@mail.xjtu.edu.cn
Quantum strategies have been successfully applied to game theory for years. However,
as a reverse problem of game theory, the theory of mechanism design is ignored by
physicists. In this paper, the theory of mechanism design is generalized to a quantum
domain. The main result is that by virtue of a quantum mechanism, agents who satisfy
a certain condition can combat “bad” social choice rules instead of being restricted by
the traditional mechanism design theory.
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1. Introduction
Game theory is a very useful tool for investigating rational decision making in
conflict situations. It was first founded by von Neumann and Morgenstern 1. Since
its beginning, game theory has been widely applied to many disciplines, such as
economics, politics, biology and so on. Compared with game theory, the theory
of mechanism design simply concerns the reverse question: given some desirable
outcomes, can we design a game that produces them?
As Serrano 2 has described, we suppose that the goals of a group of self-interested
agents (or a society) can be summarized in a social choice rule (SCR). An SCR is
a mapping that prescribes the social outcome (or outcomes) on the basis of agents’
preferences over the set of all social outcomes 3. The theory of mechanism design
answers the important question of whether and how it is possible to implement
different SCRs. According to Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m 4, whether or not an SCR is
implementable depends on which game theoretic solution concept is used (e.g.,
dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium). Reference 3 is a fundamental work in
the field of mechanism design. It provides an almost complete characterization of
social choice rules that are Nash implementable.
In 1999, some pioneering breakthroughs were made in the field of quantum
games 5,6. The game proposed by Eisert et al 5 showed fascinating “quantum ad-
vantages” as a result of a novel quantum Nash equilibrium. Benjamin and Hayden
7, Du et al 8, Flitney and Hollenberg 9 investigated multiplayer quantum Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Guo et al 10 gave a detailed review on quantum games. As a comparison,
so far the theory of mechanism design is still investigated only by economists. To
the best of our knowledge, up to now, there is no research in the cross field between
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quantum mechanics and mechanism design. Motivated by quantum games, in this
paper, we will investigate what will happen if agents can use quantum strategies in
the theory of mechanism design.
Section 2 of this paper recalls some preliminaries of mechanism design published
in Ref. 2, while Sec. 3 reformulates the Maskin’s mechanism as a physical mechanism
and proves that they are equivalent to each other. Section 4 generalizes the phys-
ical mechanism to a quantum domain and proves that under a certain condition,
an original Nash implementable social choice rule will no longer be implemented.
Section 5 draws the conclusions.
2. Preliminaries
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be a finite set of agents with n ≥ 2 and A = {a1, · · · , ak} be
a finite set of social outcomes. Let Ti be the finite set of agent i’s types, and the
private information possessed by agent i is denoted as ti ∈ Ti. We refer to a profile
of types t = (t1, · · · , tn) as a state. Let T =
∏
i∈N Ti be the set of states. At state
t ∈ T , each agent i ∈ N is assumed to have a complete and transitive preference
relation ti over the set A. We denote by 
t= (t1, · · · ,
t
n) the profile of preferences
in state t. The utility of agent i for outcome a in state t is ui(a, t) : A × T → R,
i.e., ui(a, t) ≥ ui(b, t) if and only if a ti b. We denote by ≻
t
i the strict preference
part of ti. Fixing a state t, we refer to the collection E =< N,A, (
t
i)i∈N > as
an environment. Let ε be the class of possible environments. A social choice rule
(SCR) F is a mapping F : ε→ 2A\{∅}. A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) describes a
message or strategy setMi for agent i, and an outcome function g :
∏
i∈N Mi → A.
An SCR F satisfies no-veto if, whenever a ti b for all b ∈ A and for all agents
i but perhaps one j, then a ∈ F (E). An SCR F is monotonic if for every pair of
environments E and E′, and for every a ∈ F (E), whenever a ti b implies that
a t
′
i b, there holds a ∈ F (E
′). We assume that there is complete information
among the agents, i.e., the true state t is common knowledge among them. Given a
mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) played in state t, a Nash equilibrium of Γ in state t is
a strategy profile m∗ such that: ∀i ∈ N, g(m∗(t)) ti g(mi,m
∗
−i(t)), ∀mi ∈ Mi. Let
N (Γ, t) denote the set of Nash equilibria of the game induced by Γ in state t, and
g(N (Γ, t)) denote the corresponding set of Nash equilibrium outcomes. An SCR F
is Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) such that for
every t ∈ T , g(N (Γ, t)) = F (t).
Maskin 3 provided an almost complete characterization of social choice rules
that were Nash implementable. The main results of Ref. 3 are two theorems: (i)
(Necessity) If an SCR F is Nash implementable, then it is monotonic. (ii) (Suf-
ficiency) Let n ≥ 3, if an SCR F is monotonic and satisfies no-veto, then it is
Nash implementable. In order to facilitate the following investigation on quantum
mechanism, we briefly recall the Maskin’s mechanism as follows 2:
Let Z+ be the set of non-negative integers. Considering the following mechanism
Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g), where agent i’s message set is Mi = A × T × Z+, we denote a
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typical message sent by agent i by mi = (ai, ti, zi). The outcome function g is
defined in the following three rules: (1) If for every agent i ∈ N , mi = (a, t, 0)
and a ∈ F (t), then g(m) = a. (2) If (n − 1) agents i 6= j send mi = (a, t, 0) and
a ∈ F (t), but agent j sends mj = (aj , tj , zj) 6= (a, t, 0), then g(m) = a if aj ≻tj a,
and g(m) = aj otherwise. (3) In all other cases, g(m) = a
′, where a′ is the outcome
chosen by the agent with the lowest index among those who announce the highest
integer.
3. Physical mechanism
It can be seen that in the Maskin’s mechanism, a message is an abstract mathemat-
ical notion. People usually neglect how it is realized physically. However, the world
is a physical world. Any information must be related to a physical entity. Here we
assume:
(i) Each agent has a coin and a card. The state of a coin can be head up or tail
up (denoted as H and T respectively).
(ii) Each agent i independently chooses a strategic action ωi whether to flip
his/her coin. The set of agent i’s action is Ωi ={Not flip, Flip}. An action ωi ∈ Ωi
chosen by agent i is defined as ωi : {H,T } → {H,T }. If ωi=Not flip, then ωi(H) =
H , ωi(T ) = T ; If ωi=Flip, then ωi(H) = T , ωi(T ) = H .
(iii) The two sides of a card are denoted as Side 0 and Side 1. The message
written on the Side 0 (or Side 1) of card i is denoted as card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)).
(iv) There is a device that can measure the state of n coins and send messages
to the designer.
Based on aforementioned assumptions, we reformulate the Maskin’s mechanism
Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) as a physical mechanism Γ
P = ((Si)i∈N , G), where Si = Ωi × Ci,
Ci is agent i’s card set, Ci = A × T × Z+ × A × T × Z+. A typical card written
by agent i is described as ci = (card(i, 0), card(i, 1)), where card(i, 0) = (ai, ti, zi),
card(i, 1) = (a′i, t
′
i, z
′
i). A physical mechanism Γ
P = ((Si)i∈N , G) describes a strat-
egy set Si for agent i and an outcome function G :
∏
i∈N Si → A. We shall
use S−i to express
∏
j 6=i Sj , and thus, a strategy profile is s = (si, s−i), where
si = (ωi, ci) ∈ Si and s−i = (ω−i, c−i) ∈ S−i. A Nash equilibrium of ΓP played in
state t is a strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s
∗
n) such that for any agent i ∈ N , si ∈ Si,
G(s∗1, · · · , s
∗
n) 
t
i G(si, s
∗
−i). Figure 1 depicts the setup of a physical mechanism.
From the viewpoint of the designer, the physical mechanism works in the same
manner as the Maskin’s mechanism. The working steps of the physical mechanism
are shown as follows:
Step 1: Nature selects a state t ∈ T and assigns t to the agents. Each coin is set
head up.
Step 2: In state t, if all agents agree that the social choice rule F is Pareto-inefficient
(or “bad”), i.e., there exist tˆ ∈ T , tˆ 6= t, aˆ ∈ F (tˆ) such that aˆ ti a ∈ F (t) for every
i ∈ N , and aˆ ≻tj a ∈ F (t) for at least one j ∈ N , then go to Step 4.
Step 3: Each agent i sets ci = ((ai, ti, zi), (ai, ti, zi)) (where ai ∈ A, ti ∈ T , zi ∈ Z+),
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ωi =Not flip. Go to Step 5.
Step 4: Each agent i sets ci = ((aˆ, tˆ, 0), (ai, ti, zi)), then chooses a strategic action
ωi ∈ Ωi whether to flip coin i.
Step 5: The device measures the state of n coins and sends card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1))
as mi to the designer if coin i is head up (or tail up). The designer receives the
overall message m = (m1, · · · ,mn) and let the final outcome be G(s) = g(m) using
rule (1), (2) and (3) defined in the Maskin’s mechanism. END.
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Fig. 1 The setup of a physical mechanism. Each agent has a coin and a card. 
The state of a coin can be head up or tail up. Each agent independently chooses 
a strategy whether to flip his/her coin. 
Card 2 
Card n
Proposition 1: Given an SCR F and a state t ∈ T , N (ΓP , t) is equivalent to
N (Γ, t).
Proof: First, define a function R : {H,T } → {0, 1}, R(H) = 0, R(T ) = 1. For
any s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s
∗
n) ∈ N (Γ
P , t) and a = G(s∗), if a is generated by Step 4 and 5,
then for each agent i, let m∗i = card(i, R(ω
∗
i (H))); if a is generated by Step 3 and 5,
then for each agent i, letm∗i = card(i, 0). Obviously,m
∗ = (m∗1, · · · ,m
∗
n) ∈ N (Γ, t).
Next, for any m∗ = (m∗1, · · · ,m
∗
n) ∈ N (Γ, t), for each agent i, let s
∗
i = (ω
∗
i , c
∗
i ),
where ω∗i=Not flip, c
∗
i = (m
∗
i ,m
∗
i ), then s
∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s
∗
n) ∈ N (Γ
P , t). 
Table 1. An example of a “bad” SCR that is mono-
tonic and satisfies no-veto.
State t1 State t2
Apple Lily Cindy Apple Lily Cindy
a3 a2 a1 a4 a3 a1
a1 a1 a3 a1 a1 a2
a2 a4 a2 a2 a2 a3
a4 a3 a4 a3 a4 a4
F (t1) = {a1} F (t2) = {a2}
Example 1: Let N = {Apple, Lily, Cindy}, T = {t1, t2}, A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}.
In each state t ∈ T , the preference relations (ti)i∈N over the outcome set A and the
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corresponding SCR F are given in Table 1. Obviously, F is monotonic and satisfies
no-veto. By Maskin’s theorem, F is Nash implementable. The SCR F is “bad” from
the viewpoint of the agents because in state t = t2, all agents unanimously prefer a
Pareto-efficient outcome a1 ∈ F (t1): for each agent i, a1 ≻
t2
i a2 ∈ F (t2). Therefore
when the true state is t2, the physical mechanism enters Step 4.
Since every agent prefers a1 to a2 in state t2, it seems that for each agent
i, (aˆ, tˆ, 0) = (a1, t1, 0) should be a unanimous card(i, 0), and “Not flip” be the
same strategic action. As a result, the outcome a1 may be generated by rule (1).
However, Apple has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from (a1, t1, 0) to (a4, ∗, ∗)
by flipping her coin, since a1 ≻
t1
Apple a4, a4 ≻
t2
Apple a1; Lily also has an incentive to
unilaterally deviate from (a1, t1, 0) to (a3, ∗, ∗) by flipping her coin, since a1 ≻
t1
Lily
a3, a3 ≻
t2
Lily a1. Cindy has no incentive to deviate from (a1, t1, 0) because a1 is
her top-ranked outcome in two states. Therefore, cApple = ((a1, t1, 0), (a4, ∗, ∗)),
cLily = ((a1, t1, 0), (a3, ∗, ∗)), cCindy = ((a1, t1, 0), (a1, t1, 0)).
Note that either Apple or Lily can certainly obtain her expected outcome only
if just one of them flips her coin and deviates from (a1, t1, 0) (If this case happens,
rule (2) will be triggered). But this condition is unreasonable, because all agents
are rational, nobody is willing to give up and let the others benefit. Therefore, both
Apple and Lily will flip their coins and deviate from (a1, t1, 0). As a result, rule (3)
will be triggered. Since Apple and Lily both have a chance to win the integer game,
the winner is uncertain. Consequently, the final outcome is uncertain between a3
and a4, denoted as a3/a4.
To sum up, although every agent prefers a1 to a2 in state t = t2, a1 cannot be
generated in Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the Maskin’s mechanism makes the Pareto-
inefficient outcome a2 be Nash implementable in state t = t2. The underlying reason
is just the same as what we have seen in the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma, i.e.,
the individual rationality is in conflict with the group rationality. In this sense, the
agents cannot combat the “bad” SCR under the classical circumstance.
4. Quantum mechanism
In 2007, Flitney and Hollenberg 9 investigated Nash equilibria in n-player quantum
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Following their procedures, we define:
ωˆ(θ, φ) ≡
[
eiφ cos(θ/2) i sin(θ/2)
i sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
]
,
Ωˆ ≡ {ωˆ(θ, φ) : θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈ [0, pi/2]}, Jˆ ≡ cos(γ/2)Iˆ⊗n + i sin(γ/2)σˆx
⊗n, where γ
is an entanglement measure, and Iˆ ≡ ωˆ(0, 0), Dˆn ≡ ωˆ(pi, pi/n), Cˆn ≡ ωˆ(0, pi/n).
In order to generalize the physical mechanism to a quantum domain, we revise
the assumptions (i) and (ii) of the physical mechanism as follows:
1) Each agent i has a quantum coin i (qubit) and a classical card i. The basis
vectors |C〉 ≡ (1, 0)T , |D〉 ≡ (0, 1)T of a quantum coin denote head up and tail up
respectively.
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Fig. 2 The setup of a quantum mechanism. Each agent has a quantum coin and a card.  Each 
agent independently performs a local unitary operation on his/her own quantum coin. 
Card 1 
Card 2 
Card n
...
Designer
g(m)
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2) Each agent i independently performs a local unitary operation on his/her own
quantum coin. The set of agent i’s operation is Ωˆi = Ωˆ. A strategic operation chosen
by agent i is denoted as ωˆi ∈ Ωˆi. If ωˆi = Iˆ , then ωˆi(|C〉) = |C〉, ωˆi(|D〉) = |D〉;
If ωˆi = Dˆn, then ωˆi(|C〉) = |D〉, ωˆi(|D〉) = |C〉. Iˆ denotes “Not flip”, Dˆn denotes
“Flip”.
Based on aforementioned amendments, we generalize the physical mechanism
ΓP = ((Si)i∈N , G) to a quantum mechanism Γ
Q = ((Sˆi)i∈N , Gˆ), which describes a
strategy set Sˆi = Ωˆi × Ci for each agent i and an outcome function Gˆ : ⊗i∈N Ωˆi ×∏
i∈N Ci → A. We shall use Sˆ−i to express ⊗j 6=iΩˆj ×
∏
j 6=i Cj , and thus, a strategy
profile is sˆ = (sˆi, sˆ−i), where sˆi ∈ Sˆi and sˆ−i ∈ Sˆ−i. A Nash equilibrium of a
quantum mechanism ΓQ played in state t is a strategy profile sˆ∗ = (sˆ∗1, · · · , sˆ
∗
n)
such that for any agent i ∈ N , sˆi ∈ Sˆi, Gˆ(sˆ
∗
1, · · · , sˆ
∗
n) 
t
i Gˆ(sˆi, sˆ
∗
−i). Figure 2
depicts the set-up of a quantum mechanism. Its working steps are shown as follows:
Step 1: Nature selects a state t ∈ T and assigns t to the agents. The state
of every quantum coin is set as |C〉. The initial state of the n quantum coins is
|ψ0〉 = |C · · ·CC〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
Step 2: In state t, if all agents agree that the social choice rule F is “bad”, i.e.,
there exist tˆ ∈ T , tˆ 6= t, aˆ ∈ F (tˆ) such that aˆ ti a ∈ F (t) for every i ∈ N , and
aˆ ≻tj a ∈ F (t) for at least one j ∈ N , then go to Step 4.
Step 3: Each agent i sets ci = ((ai, ti, zi), (ai, ti, zi)) (where ai ∈ A, ti ∈ T , zi ∈ Z+),
ωˆi = Iˆ. Go to Step 7.
Step 4: Each agent i sets ci = ((aˆ, tˆ, 0), (ai, ti, zi)). Let n quantum coins be entan-
gled by Jˆ . |ψ1〉 = Jˆ |C · · ·CC〉.
Step 5: Each agent i independently performs a local unitary operation ωˆi on his/her
own quantum coin. |ψ2〉 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn]Jˆ |C · · ·CC〉.
Step 6: Let n quantum coins be disentangled by Jˆ+. |ψ3〉 = Jˆ+[ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
ωˆn]Jˆ |C · · ·CC〉.
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Step 7: The device measures the state of n quantum coins and sends card(i, 0) (or
card(i, 1)) as mi to the designer if the state of quantum coin i is |C〉 (or |D〉).
Step 8: The designer receives the overall message m = (m1, · · · ,mn) and let the
final outcome Gˆ(sˆ) = g(m) using rules (1), (2) and (3) defined in the Maskin’s
mechanism. END.
Note that if Ωˆi is restricted to be {Iˆ , Dˆn}, then Ωˆi is equivalent to {Not flip,
Flip}. In this way, a quantum mechanism is degenerated to a physical mechanism.
Given n (n ≥ 3) agents, consider the pay-off to the nth agent, we denote by
$C···CC the expected pay-off when all agents choose Iˆ (the corresponding collapsed
state is |C · · ·CC〉), and denote by $C···CD the expected pay-off when the nth agent
chooses Dˆn and the first n− 1 agents choose Iˆ (the corresponding collapsed state
is |C · · ·CD〉). $D···DD and $D···DC are defined similarly. Unlike Flitney and Hol-
lenberg’s requirements on the pay-offs, for the case of quantum mechanism, the
requirements on the pay-offs are described as condition λ:
(i) λ1: Given a state t and an SCR F , there exist tˆ ∈ T , tˆ 6= t, aˆ ∈ F (tˆ) such that
aˆ ti a ∈ F (t) for every i ∈ N , aˆ ≻
t
j a ∈ F (t) for at least one j ∈ N , and the
number of agents that encounter a preference change around aˆ in going from state
tˆ to t is larger than unity. Denote by l the number of these agents. Without loss of
generality, let these l agents be the last l agents among n agents.
(ii) λ2: Consider the pay-off to the nth agent, $C···CC > $D···DD, i.e., he/she prefers
the expected payoff of a certain outcome (generated by rule 1) to the expected pay-
off of an uncertain outcome (generated by rule 3).
(iii) λ3: Consider the pay-off to the nth agent, $C···CC > $C···CD[1 −
sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)] + $D···DC sin
2 γ sin2(pi/l).
Proposition 2: For n ≥ 3, given a state t ∈ T and a “bad” SCR F (from the
viewpoint of agents) that is monotonic and satisfies no-veto, by virtue of a quantum
mechanism ΓQ = ((Sˆi)i∈N , Gˆ), agents satisfying condition λ can combat the “bad”
SCR F , i.e., there exists sˆ ∈ N (ΓQ, t) such that Gˆ(sˆ) /∈ F (t).
Proof: Given a state t and a “bad” SCR F , since condition λ1 is satisfied, then
there exist tˆ ∈ T , tˆ 6= t, aˆ ∈ F (tˆ) such that aˆ ti a ∈ F (t) for every i ∈ N , aˆ ≻
t
j a ∈
F (t) for at least one j ∈ N , and the number of agents that encounter a preference
change around aˆ in going from state tˆ to t is larger than unity, i.e., l ≥ 2. Let these l
agents be the last l agents among n agents. Hence, the quantum mechanism enters
Step 4. Each agent i sets ci = ((aˆ, tˆ, 0), (ai, ti, zi)). Let c = (c1, · · · , cn).
Consider the pay-off to the nth agent (denoted as Laura), when she plays ωˆ(θ, φ)
while the first n− l agents play Iˆ and the middle l − 1 agents play Cˆl = ωˆ(0, pi/l),
according to Ref. 9,
〈$Laura〉 =$C···CC cos
2(θ/2)[1− sin2 γ sin2(φ− pi/l)]
+$C···CD sin
2(θ/2)[1− sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)]
+$D···DC sin
2(θ/2) sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)
+$D···DD cos
2(θ/2) sin2 γ sin2(φ− pi/l)
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Since condition λ2 is satisfied, then $C···CC > $D···DD, Laura chooses φ = pi/l to
minimize sin2(φ − pi/l). As a result,
〈$Laura〉 =$C···CC cos
2(θ/2)
+$C···CD sin
2(θ/2)[1− sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)]
+$D···DC sin
2(θ/2) sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)
Since condition λ3 is satisfied, then Laura prefers θ = 0, which leads to 〈$Laura〉 =
$C···CC . In this case, ωˆLaura(θ, φ) = ωˆ(0, pi/l) = Cˆl.
By symmetry, in Steps 4 and 5, if the n agents choose sˆ∗ = (ωˆ∗, c), where
ωˆ∗ = (Iˆ , · · · , Iˆ , Cˆl, · · · , Cˆl) (the first n− l agents choose Iˆ, the other l agents choose
Cˆl), then sˆ
∗ ∈ N (ΓQ, t). In Step 7, the corresponding collapsed state of n quantum
coins is |C · · ·CC〉 and mi = (aˆ, tˆ, 0) for each agent i ∈ N . Consequently, in Step 8,
Gˆ(sˆ∗) = g(m) = aˆ /∈ F (t). 
Let us reconsider Example 1. The quantum mechanism enters Step 4 when the
true state is t2. Since both Apple and Lily encounter a preference change around a1
in going from state t1 to t2, condition λ1 is satisfied. cApple = ((a1, t1, 0), (a4, ∗, ∗)),
cLily = ((a1, t1, 0), (a3, ∗, ∗)), cCindy = ((a1, t1, 0), (a1, t1, 0)). Let Cindy be the first
agent. For any agent i ∈ {Apple, Lily}, let her be the last agent. Consider the
pay-off to the third agent, suppose $CCC = 3 (the corresponding outcome is a1),
$CCD = 5 (the corresponding outcome is a4 if i = Apple, and a3 if i = Lily),
$DDC = 0 (the corresponding outcome is a3 if i = Apple, and a4 if i = Lily),
$DDD = 1 (the corresponding outcome is a3/a4). Hence, condition λ2 is satisfied,
and condition λ3 becomes: 3 ≥ 5[1−sin
2 γ sin2(pi/2)]. If sin2 γ ≥ 0.4, condition λ3 is
satisfied. According to Proposition 2, the message corresponding to sˆ∗ ∈ N (ΓQ, t)
is m = (m1,m2,m3), where m1 = m2 = m3 = (a1, t1, 0). Consequently, Gˆ(sˆ
∗) =
g(m) = a1 /∈ F (t) = {a2}.
To help the reader understand the aforementioned result, let the SCR in Ta-
ble 1 be “No smoking”. Let a1 and a2 denote “Smoke” and “Drink” respectively,
then everybody prefers smoking to drinking in state t2. According to the tradi-
tional theory of mechanism design, the “No smoking” SCR can always be Nash
implemented because it is monotonic and satisfies no-veto. However, by virtue of
quantum strategies, the agents can combat the “No smoking” SCR!
Remark: In Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m 4, the authors used a modulo game instead
of the integer game. The rule 3 is replaced by “(3) In all other cases, g(m) = aj ,
for j ∈ N such that j = (
∑
i∈N zi)(mod n)”. Similar to aforementioned analysis, it
can be derived that the results of this paper still hold.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper considers what will happen if agents can use quantum
strategies in the theory of mechanism design. Two results are obtained: (i) We find
that the success of the Maskin’s mechanism is built on an underlying Prisoner’s
Dilemma. (ii) Under the classical circumstance, if an SCR is monotonic and satisfies
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no-veto, then no matter whether it is “bad” or not (from the viewpoint of the
agents), it can be Nash implemented. However, we find that when the additional
condition λ is satisfied, an original Nash implementable “bad” SCR will no longer
be Nash implementable in the context of a quantum domain.
van Enk and Pike 11 pointed out that in quantum games, quantum strategies
simply constructed a new game and solved it, not the original game. However, from
the viewpoint of the designer, the interface between agents and the designer in the
quantum mechanism is the same as that in the Maskin’s mechanism. Therefore,
from the viewpoint of agents, quantum mechanism helps them combat “bad” social
choice rules specified by the designer.
Acknowledgments
The author is very grateful to Ms. Fang Chen, Hanyue Wu (Apple), Hanxing Wu
(Lily) and Hanchen Wu (Cindy) for their great support.
References
1. J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
(Princeton University Press, USA, 1944).
2. R. Serrano, SIAM Review 46 (2004) 377.
3. E. Maskin, Rev. Econom. Stud. 66 (1999) 23.
4. E. Maskin and T. Sjo¨stro¨m, Implementation theory, in Handbook of Social Choice and
Welfare, Vol. 1, eds. K. J. Arrow, A. Sen, K. Suzumura (Elsevier Science, New York,
2002).
5. J. Eisert, M. Wilkens and M. Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 (1999) 3077.
6. D. Meyer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82 (1999) 1052.
7. S.C. Benjamin and P.M. Hayden, Phys. Rev. A 64 (2001) 030301(R) .
8. J. Du, H. Li and X. Xu et al, Phys. Lett. A 302 (2002) 229.
9. A.P. Flitney and L.C.L. Hollenberg, Phys. Lett. A 363 (2007) 381.
10. H. Guo, J. Zhang and G.J. Koehler, Decision Support Systems 46 (2008) 318.
11. S. J. van Enk and R. Pike, Phys. Rev. A 66 (2002) 024306.
